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In the paradigm of International Historical Sociology, states and states systems (the 
international) co-constitute each other. While the HS tradition usually focuses on state 
formation, via e.g. war and capitalism, the increased incidence of failed states, and the 
current wave of them in the Middle East/North Africa, invites us to consider also the co-
constitution of state “deconstruction” or state failure.  If it is true, as Tilly’s famous 
aphorism suggests, that in the West’s state formation “war makes the state and the state 
makes war, “ so in the contemporary “periphery” “intervention makes state failure and 
state failure makes war,” as prominent studies of state failure and its spillover have 
demonstrated (Coyne 2006; Fransois and Sud 2006; Priest 2005) 
 
Historical Sociology  
Historical sociology has several advantages over other frameworks for doing 
macro level analysis on state formation, state failure and conflict.1 
First, while the dominant paradigm, neo-realism, prioritizes the structural 
systemic level and comparative politics focuses on the domestic level, HS posits the co-
constitution of the inter/trans-national and the state levels. On the one hand, it traces the 
impact of long-term macro transformations of global structure on state formation, as in 
Barrington Moore’s (1966) analysis of how agricultural modernization shaped 
dictatorship and democracy, Tilly’s (1990) account of how war-making drove state 
formation in the West and Buzan and Little (2010) on how the globalization of the 
                                                        
1 For elaborations of the following features of Historical Sociology, see Hobden and Hobsen (2002) 
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Westphalian states system under imperialism and non-Western nationalist reaction to 
it together constituted the post-colonial state order.  
On the other hand, HS’s Weberian strain (e.g. Mann 1984; Hudson 1975 ) focuses 
on agency:  shorter-term internal (domestic) state building projects and processes: such 
as the cycle between charismatic, patrimonial and bureaucratic leadership and the 
interaction of political participation and institutionalization (Huntington 1968). And as 
Buzan and Weaver (2003) argue, the kind of state prevalent in regional states 
systems—“pre-modern “patrimonial”, “modern” bureaucratic—in turn, determines its 
distinctive dynamics—with the kind of practices expected by realists—notably 
balancing threats—typical of “modern” systems. 
Second, instead of seeing the international as a uniform anarchy, as does neo-
realism, HS sees the global order as mixing elements of hierarchy and anarchy, and 
specifically the embedding of anarchic regional states system in a global hierarchy. 
Thus, Neo-Gramscian (Cox 1996) and World System’s Theory’s (2001) assumes that 
periphery states are sharply constrained by the world capitalist economy which 
successive global hegemons have sought to impose, via periodic interventions, on them. 
Yet, the hierarchical relation is one of threats and incentives, not bureaucratic command 
for in the post-colonial period, as Buzan and Weaver (2003) argue, regional states 
systems like MENA have sufficient autonomy and practices distinctive that they 
constitute a level of structure distinct from the global level. As such, MENA state 
formation and deformation has to be analysed as the outcome of interaction between 
global intervention and regional resistance or collaboration.  
Third, HS takes history seriously, and specifically path dependency, the 
expectation that historic junctures shape future possibilities, excluding certain 
trajectories and biasing outcomes toward others; thus the foundation of the MENA 
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regional states system significantly narrowed future possibilities. This is not to say that 
there is any determined progressive trajectory, as modernization theory imagines, and 
indeed,  the trajectory of MENA regional state formation has described a bell shaped 
curve. Moreover, at critical junctures agency matters, such as Saddam Hussen’s decision 
to invade Kuwait, Bashar al-Asad’s violent response to the Syrian uprising or the rise of 
ISIS. Thus, analysis of state formation and deformation has to be traced through the 
interaction of structure and agency over time. 
Fourth, HS privileges structural and material factors, but acknowledges 
ideational factors such as identity, culture and religion.  It takes a largely 
instrumentalist approach, focusing on how “political entrepreneurs”--state elites and 
oppositions--employ identity (in MENA Arabism, Islam, and currently Sunni vs Shia 
sectarianism) to mobilize support and legitimize or de-legitimize authority. However, it 
also acknowledges that identity matters: that the violation of historic MENA identities in 
the constitution of the states system encouraged a profound dissatisfaction among 
regional peoples that agents regularly exploit; the power of identity to mobilize activism 
by social movements against the status quo,  to shape legitimacy and to normatively 
constrain agents. For this reason, the current sectarianism wave, only the most recent 
episode of the identity wars that have prevailed since the founding of the states system, 
is primarily treated as an instrumentalization of religion in power struggles which 
nevertheless has unique power to affect outcomes.  
Thus the approach of this paper is to systematically uncover the interactions of 
structure and agency—more specifically how global level interventions and constraints, 
regional resources and movements, and state elites and oppositions interact to 
contribute, over the historical long term, to state formation and de-formation. It first 
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gives a historical overview of the trajectory of state formation in the Levant and follows 
this with the current deconstruction of the two states in the contemporary period.  
 
Syria and Iraq 
Nowhere better illustrates the theme of states construction and deconstruction than the 
Levant where recurrent Western intervention, indigenous state building projects, and 
state deconstruction have interacted to produce today’s unstable and violent political 
landscape. Syria and Iraq are near ‘siblings’ with key shared experiences that are 
difficult to disentangle. Firstly, their malformed construction under imperialism left 
behind fragmented ‘artificial’2 and very weak states penetrated by powerful trans-state 
identities, in which revisionist movements struggled for power, with the Pan-Arab Ba’th 
party winning out in both. Secondly, both states’ formation advanced under Ba’thist 
authoritarian regimes via a combination of party-building, oil and war. Finally, 
beginning in 2003 in Iraq, with the US invasion, and in 2011 in Syria, with the outbreak 
                                                        
2 A main theme and argument of this paper is that the Levant states were in an important sense “artificial” 
and their borders “arbitrary” and indeed that this is a major root of their long-term instability and current 
de-construction. Because this claim in highly contested and debated among scholars and observers of the 
region, I want to make clear exactly what I am contending (and what not). All states are constructed and in 
that respect are “artificial” if this is taken to mean man-made; yet as the debate between primordialist 
and constructivists/instrumentalism underlines, they cannot simply be made up, without being rooted in 
long shared traditions. The extent to which they are is likely to vary greatly and the differences between 
them only ever relative. Yet the agents and process of construction makes all the difference. Where the 
state is an organic product, home grown, chiefly the result of indigenous agency (borders in particular) 
and evolving over centuries, it is more likely to have roots, loyalty and durability; where, as in the Levant, 
it is imposed chiefly from without, with borders drawn according to the strategic interests of external 
powers, violating rather than satisfying identity, and in explicit defiance of majority regional opinion (as 
e.g. surveyed by the King-Crane Commission) they are less likely to command loyalty and likely to be 
contested. Having said this, from the founding of the system incumbent regime elites, with their strong 
interest in defending the sovereignty and separate existence of the states they governed; today majorities 
in Syria and Iraq probably continue to support the separate existence of their states. It is clear, too, that 
over time, identities started to attach to these externally constructed states; it is equally true however 
that their peoples have held multiple identities—to the sub-state, state and supra-state communities, 
which has tended to qualify and dilute identification with the state that dominates in “nation-states.” It is 
this that explains why a hundred years after the formation of the regional system, trans-states 
movements still challenge state borders and even their existence. Nor is the durability of the states as 
particularly strong evidence of their robustness since external intervention or the threat of it has regularly 
blocked or discouraged attempts to overthrow the states system by uniting its component state parts.   
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of the Syrian Uprising, both states suffered deconstruction under various combinations 
of internal revolt and external intervention. Syria and Iraq have again been reduced to 
weak states suffering loss of territorial control and challenges to their borders. This, 
allied to the penetration of both by trans-state jihadist movements, has made Syria and 
Iraq epicentres of a widening sectarianization of the whole regional system.  
 While these internal conflicts have internal origins—grievances and actors—civil 
war and state failure must be seen as “co-constituted” by local, regional and global 
actors. The dominant Western narrative usually sees the West-led “international 
community” as threatened by and or defensively intervening in failed states to 
undertake state reconstruction, with benign motives that may sometimes have 
unintended dysfunctional consequences. In reality, the Western dominated external 
world has played a major role in state deconstruction, whether through war, 
intervention or the backing of insurgents; through the imposition of a globalized neo-
liberal economic order that undermines states’ social contracts and generates highly 
inequitable crony capitalist orders; or thorough the de-legitimation of states via 
democracy promotion campaigns (Hinnebusch 2015).  
   
The Evolving Co-constitution of the Regional States System 
Understanding the current crisis requires examination of the historical context of initial 
state formation in MENA and in the Levant in particular. Western imperialism, together 
with the collaboration and resistance of local actors, ‘made’ a conflict prone and 
unstable states system. First, the Middle East was ‘born’ as an exceptionally penetrated 
(Brown 1984) periphery of the world capitalist system. Its ruling elites, in varying 
degrees, were initially imposed, co-opted or dependent on, and often more responsive 
to, global elites than their own citizenry. Second, imperial boundary drawing, which 
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took little account of regional identity or opinion, resulted in incongruence between 
dominant identities and the new states. This built irredentism (demands to redraw 
borders) into the regional order and left the new states competing for the loyalties of 
their populations with powerful sub and supra-state identities—Pan-Arabism, Pan-
Islam), i.e. suffering legitimacy deficits. Most states were fragmented by rival sub-state 
identities; on the other hand, the supra-state Arab nation and/or Islamic umma were, 
for many, a more compelling imagined community than the state itself. Iraq and Syria 
were particularly vulnerable by virtue of the multitude of sectarian and ethnic identities 
embraced by what were widely seen as artificial borders dividing up the larger 
communities with which many identified. This was exposed by the immediate and 
repeated rise in each of both separatism (e.g. Kurds) and of “Pan” movements and states 
bidding to re-unify the region, whether in ‘Greater Syria, ‘Fertile Crescent’ or Pan-Arab 
schemes. Third, the wider Arab world became an arena of competition by rival states 
over regional leadership, largely via discourse wars, forcing all regimes to defend their 
legitimacy by being seen to act on behalf of an Arab or Islamic interests (Barnett 1998). 
Fourth, the Middle East states system was ‘born fighting,’ as Buzan (2003) put it: by the 
imposition of a militarized and mobilized Israeli settler state generating intense 
insecurity especially on its borders; by arbitrary imperial boundary drawing which 
produced a multitude of boundary disputes and powerful irredentist movements 
challenging borders; and by destabilising power imbalances from the juxtaposition of 
large stronger states and small mini-states (e.g. Iraq and Kuwait). Thus, from the outset, 
each state felt threatened both by neighbours and by internal, often-trans-state, 
opposition networks used by rival states to subvert their rivals. The troubled 
trajectories of the Levant states are ultimately rooted in the ‘original sin’ committed by 
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the imperial powers at the end of WWI in what Fromkin (1989) called a ‘peace to end all 
peace’.  
 Yet MENA states were also ‘born’ with the material apparatus of governance 
over a fixed territory and, with independence, were accorded formal sovereignty; state-
builders, although dealt weak hands, nevertheless set out to make this formal 
sovereignty real. State formation evolved over several identifiable phases. Initially, 
actual state sovereignty was very weak, both in terms of external independence and 
internal territorial control. The immediate post-independence years, 1945-56, was a 
period of weak oligarchic states (whether republican or monarchic) that suffered both 
high levels of penetration by external powers, especially the British hegemon, and also 
rising revolutionary nationalist trans-state opposition. In the 1950s and 1960s many 
oligarchic regimes were overthrown and more legitimate but initially highly unstable 
populist republics emerged. While most states were being destabilised by revolutionary 
trans-state movements, the exception was Egypt, under Nasser, whose early lead in 
state formation, as the first successful populist authoritarian regime in the region, 
allowed it to assert a credible claim as Arab regional hegemon over much weaker rival 
states. This enabled Cairo to promote Pan-Arab norms and briefly roll back the high 
external penetration of the region. But the other Arab states remained fragile and 
unstable, whether republics or monarchies, subject to “praetorianism”—coups, riots, 
etc. and highly vulnerable to trans-state, regional or global interference. Iraq and Syria 
exhibited the most extreme cases of such “praetorianism.” 
 Yet, the ‘original sins’ of a flawed state system, external dependency, domestic 
instability and inter-state threats, were major incentives for state building. In trying to 
assert actual sovereignty, Arab state builders gravitated, as a matter of path-
dependency, toward neo-patrimonial practices that combined time-honoured 
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indigenous state-building formulas, notably Ibn Khaldun’s assabiya (elite solidarity built 
on primordial ties but also a shared nationalist or religious-ideological mission) with 
modern bureaucratic machinery. While the initially meagre resources at the disposal of 
most state builders sharply limited their co-optation capacity, the hydrocarbon rent 
boom of the seventies greatly increased their abilities to buy loyalty and consolidate 
regimes. In the 1970-90 period of state consolidation, states, including Syria and Iraq, 
were able, taking advantage of global bi-polar system that led the superpowers to 
compete for clients in the region and largely relying on rent extracted from the 
international system (oil market, super-power patronage), to built up their bureaucratic 
and military capabilities which also, however, gave them greater military capacities to 
both threaten and deter their neighbours; militarization led to wars which motivated 
and legitimized state building.  
 Even in notoriously unstable Syria and Iraq, a rising trajectory of state formation 
was underway as war and oil led to consolidation of quite similar Ba’thist neo-
patrimonial leader-army-party states; legitimized by nationalism and a populist social 
contract, based on redistributive reforms (land reform) and economic entitlements, 
these authoritarian regimes contracted pluralism and elite competition while widening 
mass incorporation via bureaucratic and party organization and unionization (“populist 
corporatism”), thus stabilizing the state, which became more immune to trans-state 
penetration than hitherto. Paradoxically, under Pan-Arab Ba’thism, the “normalisation” 
of the state appeared to advance as the centralisation of power over coercive and 
distributive apparatuses in Damascus and Baghdad, plus wars with Israel and Iran, 
strengthened state-centric identities. The new power of state identities could be seen in 
the ability of Syria and Iraq to wage war with huge conscript armies prepared to fight 
for the states against their enemies--most striking was the willingness of Shi’a Iraqi 
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Arabs to fight against Shi’a Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war (Mufti 1996). 
 However, these state building projects were never more than partly successful 
and had their own costs and vulnerabilities and, again Iraq and Syria manifested these 
in the most accentuated form. They suffered from dependence on ‘insider’ elite assabiya, 
which tended to alienate ‘outsiders—other identity groups;’ and on rents for the 
material resources needed for state building, which were finite. Also, the reliance on 
Arab nationalism, anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism for legitimacy not only tended to 
embroil them in protracted conflicts (Iraq with Iran; Syria with Israel) but also to make 
them targets of Western hostility.  
 The 1980s peak in state building was reversed by the beginning of the 1990s, 
with the fall of oil prices; the end of the Cold War and the rise of US hegemony; and the 
dominance of global finance capital and neo-liberal penetration of the region. The 
measures taken in this era to address states’ inherited vulnerabilities, particularly rent-
dependent economies, such as the turn to neo-liberalism and crony capitalism, apparent 
everywhere by the late 1980s, had accumulating costs. The 1990-2010 period was one 
of weakening states, most of which became increasingly dependent on the West (the 
“core”) for rents and security. Initially, Syria and Iraq were the exceptions to this 
dependency on the West, each seeking to maintain its hard won sovereignty and 
preserve its anti-imperialist legitimacy; although their “solutions” to their 
vulnerabilities adopted as the Cold War ended were direct opposites--war for Iraq and 
infitah/peace process for Syria--both failed to resolve the underlying problems: 
economic troubles and/or Western hostility.  
  The end of bi-polarity and the 1990-2010 era of US hegemony over the MENA 
region was initiated by the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the consequent US-led war on 
Iraq, Iraq’s defeat, a massively increased US military presence in the Gulf and a decade 
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of sanctions that debilitated the Iraqi state. US interventionism culminated in the 2003 
US invasion of Iraq. Yet, ultimately, the unintended consequence of two US wars against 
Iraq was the creation of a failed state and a vacuum in which jihadist non-state 
movements flourished. US militaristic interventionism also unleashed a regional power 
struggle, bifurcating MENA into pro and anti-US alliances: the post-Saddam shift of Iraq 
into Iran’s orbit alarmed Sunni powers who conducted a campaign to revive trans-state 
Sunni identity against what they called a ‘Shi’a Crescent’, stretching from Iran to 
Lebanon. The latter, grouping Syria with Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah constructed a 
counter-narrative in which they constituted a ‘Resistance Front’ defending the region 
against Western and Israel-aligned Sunni regimes, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia. For 
a period, backed by Pan-Arab satellite TV and Hezbollah’s demonstrated prowess 
against Israel, the resistance axis held the ascendency. But the overall impact was to 
create intense rivalries that led to the profound destabilization of the regional order 
after 2010.  
 The post-2010 period of the Arab Uprisings witnessed a combination of 
exploding domestic/trans-state opposition to regimes and external war or intervention 
that further deconstructed already weakened states and turned Syria, previously a 
major actor in regional politics, into an arenas of trans-state identity wars similar to 
what had happened to Iraq after the US invasion. Reversing decades of state formation, 
Syria and Iraq were reduced to weak—indeed failed--penetrated states reminiscent of 
the early independence years, except that trans-state conflict was conducted with much 
higher levels of mobilisation, militarisation, and sectarianisation than the low level 
subversion of the earlier Pan-Arab period. Also symptomatic of the deeper collapse of 
states was the loss of territorial control by regimes to insurgent movements, resulting 
in a de-facto partition, or ‘Somalisation’, of both countries (Dukhan 2013). This, plus the 
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debilitation of the states’ capacity for inclusive co-optation and their inability to 
provide, not only material benefits, but even basic security, gave trans-state Islamic 
activists an unprecedented window of opportunity to mobilize support. This included 
the profoundly revisionist ISIS challenge to the borders of the two states in pursuit of an 
agenda explicitly aimed at the overthrown of the regional states system. And if the Iraqi 
and Syrian states had previously been key actors in the promotion of an inclusive Pan-
Arab identity, they now became the epicenters of a widening sectarian fragmentation of 
the whole regional system. Table 1 summarizes these phases in state formation.  
 Table 1: Phases in the co-constitution of MENA state formation and de-construction 
Phase of State 
Formation 
/Deconstruction 
External (global and regional) 
Factors in State formation and 
deconstruction  
Internal Factors in State 
Formation and 
deconstruction  
Imposition of 
Regional states 
system 
British Imperialism creates 
flawed states incongruent with 
regional identity 
irredentism built-into the states 
system 
*Collaboration and resistance by 
local forces 
Early State 
formation & Pan-
Arab  
Revolution 
*British hegemony contested 
with  
emergent bi-polarity+  
*trans-state Arab nationalist 
movements  
 regional resistance 
(Nasserism)  
*Fragile oligarchies overthrown 
by praetorian republics  
State 
Construction 
*Bi-polar rivalrypatronage for 
regional  
     state-building 
*Oil price boomrent for  
    regional state building 
*Regional Warmilitarization 
   insecurity national security 
states 
*Populist Neo-Patrimonialism 
  elite cores built around 
assabiyeh 
  bureaucratization (army, 
party) 
  populist corporatism 
 *Regime legitimation via 
  nationalism+ populist ‘social 
contract’ 
State Decline *War costs+oil price/rent 
falldebt 
*Rise of global finance capitalism 
+neo-liberal ideological 
hegemony 
*End of Cold WarUS global 
Hegemony-> 
  US interventionism in MENA 
*Post-populist Neo-
Patrimonialism 
  Crony capitalist social base 
  Exclusionary corporatism  
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State De-
Construction 
*Decline of US 
Hegemonycompetitive  
   global rivalry over MENA 
*Regional Power struggle 
(between Sunni-and Shia 
regimes 
*Trans-state Islamist 
movements,    
  empowerment of jihadists,  
  sectarian bifurcation of region 
 
*Outside-In Deconstruction of 
IraqUS  
  invasion unleashes centrifugal 
forces 
*Inside-Out Deconstruction of 
Syria 
*centrifugal local forces invites 
competitive external 
intervention 
*Failed states (loss of territorial 
sovereignty, 
 institutional debilitation, 
identity fragmentation) 
 
As the table highlights, at each phase of state evolution in Iraq and Syria, the global, 
regional and local have co-constituted outcomes. In both states similar vulnerabilities 
left behind by imperialism precipitated similar state building projects under the Ba’th 
party, which had themselves similar vulnerabilities: their only-partial inclusion of social 
forces, dependence on external rent and nationalist projects that generated 
international hostility that boomeranged on both regimes. But external interventions, 
taking different forms, also played pivotal roles in state de-construction. The difference 
is that the main impetus to state deconstruction in Iraq was “outside-in,” where the US 
invasion destroyed the state, unleashing and aggravating pre-existing centrifugal forces 
and leaving behind a debilitated, territorially divided failed state. In Syria 
deconstruction was “inside-out”: domestic civil war drew in external interventions 
which intensified the conflict, and in creating stalemate, led to a similarly failed, 
territorially divided state. The following sections examine the last phase—that of state 
de-construction--in detail. 
 
State Deconstruction in Iraq:  
US Hegemony and Iraqi Deconstruction: from Sanctions to Insurgency  
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Little has been written on the role of the “international” in state-destruction, but Iraq is 
perhaps the clearest case study where the American global hegemon, supposedly a 
benign protector of global stability (in the view of “hegemonic stability theory”) became, 
under George W. Bush, a malign actor spreading in MENA what the neo-cons called 
“creative destruction.”   
 The Iraqi Ba’th regime had, after a decade of relatively successful state building, 
started to decline in inclusiveness as a result of a decade of power struggle and two 
wars. Saddam Hussein’s consolidation of power in the 1980s came at the expense of the 
collegial leadership of the Ba’th party and led to the purge of many Shia Ba’thists, 
making the regime more dependent on Saddam’s Takriti Sunni in-group. During the 
Iran-Iraq war the regime had responded to perceived attempts by Kurdish and Shia 
elements to use Iranian support against Baghdad with highly repressive measures 
including the forced relocation of Kurds and the forced expulsion of many Arab Shia of 
Iranian decent to Iran. The consequences of this alienation were sharply exposed when 
the weakening of the regime by the in 1990-91 Gulf war defeat was immediately 
followed by insurgencies among both Kurds and Shia Iraqis. But although the US had 
encouraged the uprisings, it did nothing to prevent Saddam, as his regime recovered its 
coercive capacities, from repression of the Shia south (for fear that Iran would benefit 
from it). It was a different story in the north, however, where a no-fly zone enabled the 
Kurds to wrest autonomy from the central government. Thus, the loss of inclusionary 
capacity by the Iraqi Ba’th regime made it highly vulnerable to the centrifugal impact of 
external shocks.  
 State deconstruction was furthered by the impact of the US-led sanctions regime 
throughout the 1990s. Sanctions greatly weakened the central government, debilitated 
the middle class, destroyed the social contract and forced people to fall back on their 
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communal groups for support. The Saddam regime fostered tribalism as a substitute for 
the deteriorating Ba’th party (Baram 1997). In parallel, centrifugal forces were growing 
in the soil of state debilitation: the US sponsored an autonomous regional government 
in the Kurdish north while exiled Shi’a leaders and their followers were positioned in 
Iran and Syria, that, with the US invasion of 2003, were parachuted in from exile.  
 The US, with its “shock and awe” assault on Iraq’s cities, armies and 
infrastructure, had little trouble defeating Saddam’s regime but thereafter it failed to 
deploy the manpower to stop the collapse of law and order in Iraq. By its decapitating of 
the regime, its dissolution of its pillars, the party, army and bureaucracy, and its 
debilitation of the central government, the US further empowered centrifugal social 
forces. The degradation of the social and physical infrastructure, including electricity, 
potable water, and sewage systems, was not reversed. The killing of at least half a 
million Iraqis (Burnham, et. al, 2006; Hagopian et.al 2013) and the displacement of four 
million, meant the destruction of the Iraqi middle class, while the collapse of the 
educational system resulted in a lost generation and a growth of illiteracy. The anomie 
and intense insecurity under the occupation led to a massive exodus from Iraq, 
depriving the country of its natural leadership (Dodge 2006; Hashim 2004: Rosen 
2010). 
 The invasion and occupation inevitably stimulated resistance, particularly 
among the Sunni Arab population alienated by the loss of status and employment that 
came with the US disbanding of the armed forces and by the violent tactics of the US 
occupation forces. The insurgency was led by former regime military and security 
personnel in alliance with the Sunni clergy, bolstered by trans-state movement of Salafis 
and jihadis and cross-border tribal groups, for whom Iraq’s porous boundaries were 
entirely artificial. In August 2004 Shi’i insurgents under anti-imperialist populist 
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Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf and Karbala, mobilizing the Shia dispossessed, joined the 
insurgency, while also contesting the empowerment of US-supported Shia politicians 
who had been in Iranian exile (Dodge 2006; Hashim 2004; Rosen 2010).  
 Ultimately the insurgency remained too divided and localized to drive the 
Americans out and they were, indeed, able to exploit Iraqi divisions to get the upper 
hand over the resistance. The Sunni insurgency was soon divided between jihadists, 
especially non-Iraqis, and more moderate tribal elements, allowing the US to co-opt the 
tribal Sahwa or Awakening Councils against the jihadists. Sunni on Shia violence 
disrupted the tacit anti-occupation alliance with the Sadrists. The bombing of a Shiite 
shrine in Samarra, precipitated an unprecedented sectarian mobilization that was never 
to be reversed; after the parliamentary election of 2005 which empowered a Shia 
majority, while largely excluding the Sunnis, the insurgency against the occupation 
power was eclipsed by inter-Iraqi sectarian violence in which thousands died during 
2006 and 2007.  
  
Iraq’s flawed reconstruction from above under US occupation 
Iraq’s reconstruction was very similar to the original British imposition of the states 
system in creating a flawed regime with instability built into it. The US-co-opted new 
Iraqi elites, largely returning exiles without local bases, were chosen according to 
ethnic, sectarian and regional quotas while demonizing and excluding those with local 
support such as the Ba’thists and Sadrists. The US designed a constitution that 
distributed posts and resources according to a consociational/federal formula, 
institutionalising separate identities at the expense not only of the former Arab identity 
of the country but also of Iraqi identity. This fostering of sectarian identities facilitated 
divide and rule, “dissolving the hard-won unity of a long state-building project” (Baker, 
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Ismael and Ismael 2012). The formerly-exiled Shia politicians, depended on sectarian 
enmity, religious networks and paramount Shia Ayatollah al-Sistani’s authority to 
mobilize support. The US had planned to co-opt reliable clients into an unelected 
government until forced by al-Sistani to concede elections: but elections run on the 
basis of sectarian solidarity ensured Shia dominance and the marginalisation of the 
Sunnis (Harling 2013; Rosen 2010; Caryl 2013).  
 Government ministries, gutted of qualified staff under the de-Ba’thification 
campaign, were turned over to various sectarian based and/or exile led parties. The US 
dismantling of the professional military left a security vacuum, in which militias 
engaged in protection rackets. The hasty recruitment of unqualified Shia sectarian 
militias into a new army and parallel overlapping special forces and security agencies, 
meant the security forces were bound to be regarded as an occupying force in Sunni 
areas; the Kurdish armed groups answered to their own separatist leadership By 2009, 
the Iraqi army had been ostensibly reconstituted, with 650,000 under arms and in 
nominal control of much of the country. The 1,242 violent incidents in April 2009 was 
less than half that the year before. Yet in 2010, violence by armed terrorist groups 
continued, checkpoints lined the highways, US-built walls divided neighbourhoods, and 
people feared to travel to areas under the opposing sect. The state still did not enjoy a 
monopoly of violence, a key indicator of “stateness” (Rogers 2010; Al-Ali 2010). 
 In parallel, the dismantling of the state-centered economy under US pro-consul 
Paul Bremmer in favour of an extreme neo-liberal market model marked by 
privatization designed to open the fragile Iraqi market to foreign capital, especially 
American, had the effect of further debilitating the state’s economic capacity. The most 
dramatic transformation took place in the countryside, which became a shadow of its 
former self as irrigation dependent on electricity was never restored to pre-invasion 
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level; youth therefore flooded into the cities and the bloated military; and 
desertification and dust storms spread; meanwhile in a classic rentier state syndrome, 
import booms debilitated productive enterprise (Al-Ali 2010). 
   
Territorial deconstruction 
The US also left unsettled issues that made for intractable intra-Iraqi conflict, notably 
disputed territories and distribution of resources between the regions and central 
government. To appease their Kurdish allies US constitution makers added provisions 
legitimizing Kurdish autonomy which encouraged others to follow suit: other provinces 
were also given the right to group into autonomous ethno-sectarian defined regions, 
thus building in the potential for extreme decentralization and separatism. Kurdish-
Arab conflicts over territory and oil centred around the Kirkuk issue: the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) sought to annex Kirkuk and in 2005 succeeded in inserting 
an article in the Iraqi constitution stipulating a popular referendum on the status of the 
province; thereafter large numbers of Kurds migrated to Kirkuk, which tipped the 
province’s demographic balance in their favour (Parker: 2009). After the rise of ISIS 
drove the Iraqi army out of the region, Kurdish forces used the opportunity to tighten 
their control of Kirkuk. 
 The KRG sought to appropriate as its patrimony the estimated 45bn barrels of oil 
reserves in the area, but this was contested by the Baghdad government that claimed 
sovereignty over the national oil reserves; a compromise revenue-sharing agreement 
was proposed but remained a matter of contestation. Until agreement was reached, 
production-sharing contracts with foreign companies were legally problematic but this 
did not stop some companies from going ahead with agreements with the KRG. As the 
only stable part of Iraq, inward investment began to come in, and remarkably from 
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Turkey (which once would have seen an autonomous Kurdish region as likely to 
stimulate Kurdish separatism at home) whose construction companies won contracts to 
build infrastructure. Turkey struck an alliance with the KDP not only against the anti-
Turkish PKK but also against Baghdad, tending to pull Kurdistan’s centre of gravity 
away from the Iraqi centre. Symptomatic of this distancing of Baghdad was that young 
Kurds started studying English rather than Arabic as a second language (Black 2010). 
 As for the Shia, although united around a determination to maintain Shia power, 
they were divided over the territorial issue: while the Supreme Islamic Council (and its 
Badr Brigade) advocated an autonomous southern provinces analogous to the Kurdish 
region that would enable them to monopolize that region’s oil, they were resisted by 
Maliki’s al-Dawa party and the Sadrists in the name of Iraqi state nationalism.   
 The Sunnis alternated between rebellion and separatism against the Shia 
dominated regime and insistence on the integrity and of the Iraqi state--since they alone 
did not occupy areas with oil resources. In the early years of the invasion, having been 
pushed from power, they were the backbone of resistance; they boycotted the 2005 
elections and radical jihadis (led by al-Qaida) mounted a sectarian war against the Shia; 
but the tribal Sahwa, together with other Sunni local factions, were thereafter partly 
absorbed into provincial councils in Anbar province and the provincial state and 
security apparatus. Anti-Kurdish rhetoric gave the Sunni al-Hadba faction victory in the 
Nineveh provincial elections. However, in a reaction to the attempts of the Maliki 
regime to exclude Sunni actors and in parallel with the Sunni Uprising in Syria, which 
came to control areas contiguous to Sunni western Iraq, Sunnis also began to consider 
grouping into an autonomous region (albeit one lacking oil). This sentiment paved the 
way for their relative welcoming of ISIS. 
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 In addition to this tripartite struggle, there was a certain “ethno-sectarian 
cleansing” across the country and especially in formerly mixed Baghdad. Beginning with 
al-Qaida in Iraq bombings of Shia mosques and neighbourhoods, Sadr's militia, the 
Mahdi Army, unleashed death squads that assassinated Sunnis and drove them out of 
Shiite neighbourhoods.    This was reinforced by the walled segregation of Baghdad 
neighbourhoods started by the Americans. Writing in 2013, Harling observed that 
people rarely ventured into areas affiliated to the opposing camp because “prejudice is 
now expressed openly on all sides.” And politicians routinely use it as a tool, mobilising 
support through fear of the “other” (Al-Ali 2010). 
 
Electoral Sectarianism and Clientalism 
In principle elections give all actors a stake in the system from the expectation that their 
votes matter and that they can win office. In post-invasion Iraq, however, the main 
political blocs were sectarian and elections intensified sectarian majoritarianism that 
meant the Shia parties would likely always win them. Thus, in the first national 
elections of 2005, the Islamic Dawa party of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), along with the Sadrists, came together to secure 
the Shia’s dominant position in the political system, in coalition with the Kurds who, e.g. 
secured the presidency. Sunnis boycotted the 2005 elections and their exclusion fed the 
sectarian violence that followed. 
  The new regime started with a very low level of institutionalization. On 
becoming prime minister in 2006, al-Maliki’s office was so constitutionally weak he 
could not even direct his cabinet, divided up among rival parties demanding their share 
of spoils. The vague division of official powers among the president, prime minister, 
cabinet, and parliament became the foci of on-going power struggles in which, as 
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Harling (2013) put it, everything had to be negotiated and renegotiated and the rules 
were arbitrarily manipulated. Power was built by patronage practices in which rival 
politicians competed to construct clientele networks, often on the basis of 
misappropriated US or Iraqi funds. Iraq ranked as the third or fourth worst country in 
the world for corruption in 2006-2009. It was extremely difficult to prosecute officials 
for corruption since ministers had a veto over investigations and corrupt figures were 
protected by their militias; the MPs supposed to hold the executive accountable voted 
themselves extremely high salaries and perks; indeed, access to office was sought in 
order to acquire such resources (Kadhim 2010). 
 In this context, al-Maliki, through dubious constitutional means, declared himself 
commander in chief of the army and inserted his personal followers into paramilitary 
and intelligence agencies and as regional military bosses, by-passing the defence 
ministry headed by a Sunni politician. The bloated army of 650,000 men was turned 
into Maliki’s personal fiefdom and instrument of his power consolidation and 
repression of Sunni political forces. Al-Maliki forged a hybrid regime--an electoral 
authoritarianism, with fragmented neo-patrimonialism at its core. Freedom House put 
Iraq under Maliki, despite relatively free elections, into the "Not Free" category, its 
rating on "civil liberties" the same as Iran. Governance, as compared to Saddam’s rule, 
was less repressive but more corrupt and with less bureaucratic capacity, territorial 
control and governmental monopoly of violence (Kadhim 2010).  
  A neo-patrimonial leader had re-emerged, with the potential to check Iraq’s 
centrifugal forces and for a period Maliki used his predominance to advance state 
strengthening. He used the Iraqi army against the Shia militias in Basra who had 
alienated the population by their protection rackets. He also opposed the decentralizing 
agendas of the Kurds and pro-Iranian Shia militias in Basra. He broke with his former 
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Shia partners, who resented his monopoly of power, and promoted himself as an Iraqi 
nationalist, naming his coalition ‘State of Law’ to appeal to a population hungry for law 
and order. Indicative of his popularity, his party won a plurality in the 2009 provincial 
elections (Dodge 2012).  
 Indeed, Iraqis professed to abhor sectarianism, which they blamed for the civil 
war and the debilitation of the state, with 79% of poll respondents wanting inter-
sectarian reconciliation and cooperation. In the 2010 parliamentary elections two 
coalitions promoting nationalist over sectarian agendas emerged as the main vote-
getters. The secular Shia politician, Iyad Allawi, put together a cross-sectarian coalition 
based on Iraqi nationalism, al-Iraqiyya, which mobilized the Sunnis who had a 
particular stake in reversing the sectarianism that kept them a minority. Yet, on the eve 
of the elections, Maliki, fearing al-Iraqiyya’s cross-sectarian appeal, demanded that the 
de-Ba’thification Committee set up under the US occupation ban al-Iraqiyya candidates 
who had been Ba’th party members; this, however, only rallied Sunnis to the party. The 
voting therefore tended to break down along sectarian lines between the two main 
coalitions, diluted only by loose local alliances, tribal and Islamist, that reflecting the 
deeper fragmentation of Iraq. Allawi won more votes and his list emerged with a two 
seat (91-89) advantage in parliament, but the de-Ba’thization committee disqualified 
two successful Iraqiyya candidates and the Shia parties, driven together by the fear of 
Ba’thist and Sunni resurgence, backed al-Maliki. The Kurds, who saw the Sunni al-
Iraqiyya politicians as hostile to their separatist aims, especially in Kirkuk, also threw 
their support to him. When Maliki managed to coopt two key Sunni politicians from 
Iraqiyya by offering them posts in his cabinet, he was able to form a government despite 
coming second in the elections. Moving toward Shia sectarianism and away from Iraqi 
nationalism, he re-forged his frayed connections with Shia militias. He then moved 
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against the Sunni Vice President Hashimi, who was accused of involvement in terrorism 
and who took refuge in the Kurdish region where the writ of the central government did 
not run. Iraqiyya ceased to be a political force and Iraqi politics fell back into ethno-
sectarian moulds. Thus, despite elections, the tendency of Shi’a demographic majorities 
to translate into a permanent Shi’a monopoly of power and the authoritarian power 
consolidation practices of the Nouri al-Maliki government together alienated the Sunnis 
and led to a resurgence of the sectarian conflict that had briefly receded (Dodge 2012; 
Hiltermann: 2010a; 2010b; International Crisis Group 2013).  
 In March 2011, demonstrations inspired by Arab Uprising spread to Iraq 
demanding reform, protesting the hated separation walls and also the Green zone 
complex of government buildings, which the US had made the nerve centre of the 
occupation, and was now a well secured place of privileged political elites. The slogans 
of the protestors included: "The people's oil is for the people not for the thieves;" Iraqis 
expressed anger over poor infrastructure and lack of reliable power supplies ten years 
after the invasion, despite all the money spent, and in striking contrast to the ability of 
the Saddam regime to quickly restore services after the Kuwait war.  Nevertheless, 
cross-cutting ethno-sectarian cleavages prevented the protests from gaining the 
traction they did in less fragmented societies. Moreover, the Maliki regime increasingly 
used the army against Sunni protestors, inflaming them against the government. Key 
Sunni politicians were arrested. Elections went ahead in 2014 inspite of significant 
parts of Sunni provinces having fallen to ISIS control. Shia dominance was confirmed, 
with Shia partis winning 160 seats to 38 for Sunni parties and 21 for Allwai’s secular 
Wataniyya. The continued replication of sectarian majoritarianism, reconfirmed Sunni 
marginalization, a major explanation for the appeal of ISIS. 
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Iraq in the Maelstrom of Regional Power Struggle 
This fragmented Iraqi state could neither articulate an agreed national interest nor a 
foreign policy position that would make it an effective actor in the regional power 
struggle, as it had been under Ba’th rule. Rather, it became a battleground of regional 
politics. External actors sought to penetrate Iraq via their local proxies who sought to 
manipulate or draw them in on their side in a way quite indicative of a weak penetrated 
state, similar to Lebanon and to Syria before 1963. Indeed, Iraq, along with Lebanon, 
was the main battleground of the 2003-11 regional struggle between the rival 
US/Saudi-led (moderate/Sunni) and Iran-led (resistance/Shi’a) axes. The Sunni powers 
did not accept Shi’a rule in Baghdad. The Saudis perceived Maliki as an Iranian proxy, 
backed his rivals among the Sunnis and financed Sunni Islamist proxies to counter 
Iranian influence, thereby driving Shia politicians into greater dependence on Iran. 
Similarly, Turkey also developed intimate ties with Iraqi Sunni politicians and the Iraqi 
Kurds, pulling them away from the influence of Baghdad (Arun and Abeer 2010). The 
formation of the Iraqi government after the 2010 election was a pivotal opportunity for 
outside powers to affect Iraq’s tangent. Turkey helped in the formation of Allawi’s trans-
sectarian Iraqiyya coalition to contest Maliki’s premiership, while Iran tried to broker a 
Shi’a majority bloc to keep the it out of power. While the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) was aligned with Turkey, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) supported Iran. 
The ISIS seizure of Mosul further deepened the sectarian fragmentation and external 
intervention in Iraq. Although Maliki was replaced, under US pressure, by a new Prime 
Minister Haidar al-Abadi who spoke the language of inclusion, with the failure of the 
professional military to stand up to ISIS, the Shia militias were re-empowered to fight it, 
with ever increasing Iranian support.   
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State Deconstruction in Syria 
Regime Vulnerabilities 
In Syria, a similar outcome to the state deconstruction in Iraq unfolded almost a decade 
later, albeit owing to a somewhat different combination of external and internal forces. 
The regime’s special vulnerability had always been its dominance by Alawi military 
officers in a Sunni-majority society. This was initially overcome by the Ba’th party’s 
organizational penetration of the countryside. The nationalisation and land reform 
programs that broke the dominance of the Sunni oligarchy gave the regime the means to 
win over popular constituencies, especially peasants; a via a populist social contract and 
a nationalist foreign policy also won a measure of support. However, the exhaustion of 
the public sector as an engine of development after 1980 meant the regime could only 
be sustained by rent accessed through foreign policy, at which Hafez al-Assad was very 
adept.  
 Bashar al-Asad came to power at a particularly dangerous time for the Arab 
republics—when the West was simultaneously exporting neo-liberalism as the only 
legitimate economic course, which in MENA meant favouring investors and 
deconstructing the populist social contract by which the republics had legitimized 
themselves; at the same time the West’s democracy promotion discourse tended to de-
legitimize authoritarian regimes, particularly once they departed from their initial 
social contract. Asad followed, if belatedly, on the same neo-liberal course, favouring 
crony capitalists and dismantling the welfare state. At the same time, the regime’s 
defiance of the US in Iraq and Lebanon brought isolation from the West, making the 
regime dependent on Gulf investment, which drove a boom in tourism and real estate in 
big cities, while the regime’s original constituency, a countryside suffering severe 
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drought, was neglected. Population growth drove the numbers of unemployed youth 
well beyond the capacity of the declining state to absorb. At the same time, in order to 
establish his authority within the regime, Assad purged prominent Sunni politicos and 
concentrated power in his family clan, sacrificing the former’s clientele networks in 
society. He also curbed the role of the party and peasant/worker unions, where 
opposition to neo-liberal reforms were concentrated, thereby debilitating the regime’s 
organised social base to Sunni rural society.  
 
From Uprising to Civil War 
The opposing sides in the Syrian Uprising reflected the regime’s reconfiguration of its 
social base. It began in the deprived rural towns and suburbs, and then spread to 
medium sized cities, for example Homs, where small manufacturers were victims of 
trade liberalization, and Hama, the traditional bastion of Sunni notables long resentful 
of the ‘Alawi| regime. The main cities, Damascus and Aleppo, where investment and 
consumption were concentrated, remained largely quiescent months into the uprising 
(Hinnebusch and Zintl 2014; Wieland 2012).  
 The conflict in Syria began with mass protest against the regime and 
deteriorated into sectarian-tinged civil war in a failed state divided into warring zones. 
When the Uprising started, Assad’s security solution, the brutal repression of peaceful 
demonstrators, caused what had been localised protests demanding reform to spiral 
into a major uprising calling for the overthrow of the regime. In parallel, Assad deployed 
a sectarian discourse aimed at generating minority solidarity behind his regime, 
denouncing protestors as jihadi terrorists and relying on Alawi militias to brutalise 
protestors. Also driving escalation of the conflict were the maximalist demands of the 
opposition: the “fall of the regime”-- a ‘rush to confrontation’ with the regime while the 
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latter still retained significant support (Hinnebusch 2012; Mandour 2013). A 
compromise political settlement between the two sides soon became impossible. The 
regime, made up of hardened Machiavellians, was prepared to fight to the end to 
survive, whatever the cost to the country; constituted along neo-patrimonial lines, it 
would find it very hard to share power or to remove the president without risk of 
collapse. The opposition was dominated by ideologues, whether demanding a 
democratic or Islamic state, who could not accept compromise with an “evil” regime.  
 The opposition strategy was to de-stabilize the regime through interminable 
mass civil unrest, in order to provoke defections from the security forces, undermine 
the economy, and break the regime alliance with business. For this strategy to succeed, 
external constraints had to deter the regime’s use of full-scale repression for fear of 
provoking outside intervention. The regime, however, was not deterred from resorting 
to a ‘military solution’ that did not spare civilians. While the Asad regime’s increasing 
use of lethal force against non-violent protestors alienated wide swaths of the public, 
the opposition was constructed, among the regime’s constituency, notably minorities 
but also parts of the urban bourgeoisie, as a jihadist ‘other’, and society rapidly became 
polarized. Nevertheless, this mass punishment of populations merely intensified 
opposition and provoked Sunni defections from the army – specifically to the anti-
regime ‘Free Syrian Army’ – and later encouraged the rise of jihadists. Although the 
protests began with a cross-sectarian discourse, they took on an ever more Sunni 
Islamist cast, partly in reaction to the regime’s sectarian strategy (Hinnebusch, Imady 
and Zintl 2016). 
 As the conflict was militarized, each side hoped to win by further escalating the 
level of violence, even after victory for either seemed increasingly less likely. As more 
and more blood was shed, powerful animosities were generated and neither side could 
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imagine continued coexistence. As order broke down, the ‘security dilemma’ kicked in 
and each side resorted to defensive tactics that made both feel more insecure. 
Extremists who advocated pre-emptive violence against other communities were 
empowered and people began to be treated according to their communal identity. In 
fact, something approaching ethnic cleansing took place in certain mixed areas.  
 As the normal economy collapsed, a ‘war economy,’ in which people deprived of 
a normal life and income sought survival through spoils and flocked to militant groups 
with access to largely external funding, gave extra life to the conflict despite the damage 
it was already inflicting on all sides (Abboud 2014; Turkmani 2015). Warlordism filled 
the security gap as rival factions arose across opposition-controlled areas. Trans-state 
refugee flows, funding by Diasporas and identity groups crossing borders, and 
transnational arms trafficking embedded the conflict in wider regional struggles that 
made it all the harder to resolve. A de facto partition soon emerged, with the front lines 
fairly stabilized but authority on both sides, even the government side, de-centralized 
and localities “militiaized.” While the regime controlling Damascus and a corridor north 
to the Alawi areas, the various opposition factions controlled much of the north and 
east, with the far northeast falling under Kurdish control, and parts of the east under 
tribal control with links to Sunni tribal areas of Iraq. 
 
External Meddling 
  While the uprising was essentially indigenous, external forces also increasingly 
sought to use the uprising to their advantage. Qatar used its Pan-Arab TV channel Al-
Jazeera to amplify the uprising, while the Saudis funnelled money and arms to the tribes 
and jihadis who flooded in from across the region to fight the regime. Turkey gave save 
haven to anti-regime activists and fighters and allowed foreign Jihadists to transverse 
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Turkey for Syria. The regime’s only chance of slipping out of this tightening stranglehold 
lay with its links to Hezbollah to the west and Iran to the east. It increasingly relied on 
Hezbollah, whose fighters helped it stabilise itself and on Iran, which supplied financial 
support, training in counter-insurgency, and arms. Iraq was the pivotal connection with 
Iran and its decision to stay out of the anti-Assad coalition was decisive. It acted as a 
transit link from Iran and provided the regime with cheap oil after its oil fields came 
under opposition control. Iraqi Shia militia soon joined the battle on the regime’s side. 
For Sunnis, it was obvious that a defensive Shi’a belt had been constructed to turn back 
a Sunni Islamist revolution (Kinninmont 2014). At the global level the US and Russia 
backed the warring sides. 
 This external intervention, by global and especially regional powers was decisive 
in keeping the conflict going at ever-higher levels of violence. Each side believed that, if 
only its external patrons provided it with more resources or increased their 
intervention on its behalf that the balance of power would shift, allowing victory. Yet 
external players continued to provide their clients with enough support to keep fighting 
and avoid defeat but not enough to defeat their opponent. External funding also fuelled 
the war economy that incentivized players to continue the conflict and, in multiplying 
spoilers, obstructed any political settlement. Thus, Syria became a regional 
battleground, framed in Sunni-Shi’a terms, quite similar to Iraq. This failed state became 
a breeding ground of trans-state jihadist and salafi Islamic groups, in particular various 
al-Qaida avatars that spilled over from Iraq to fill the power vacuum, most famously, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Shams (ISIS).  
 Paradoxically, Western intervention in the Syrian crisis made things worse. First, 
the West’s discourse of democratization (and financial support for dissidents) had 
helped generate exile groups that, at an early stage, promoted the uprising; the 
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discourse of humanitarian intervention encouraged the opposition to think that the 
regime could not bring the full force of its repressive capabilities against protestors 
without provoking foreign intervention, an expectation that kept alive both their 
resistance and their unwillingness to compromise. By mid-2011 the regime, isolated 
from the West and under Western sanctions, appeared to be an international pariah. 
Western sanctions helped debilitate the regime’s capacity to fund state institutions and 
to maintain its control over wide swaths of the country. As the same time, as the West 
raised the discourse of the international criminal court, regime elites realized that, their 
bridges burned, there was no way back: they would have to stick together and do 
whatever it took to win. In parallel, Russia and China, antagonized by the West’s use of a 
UN humanitarian resolution to promote regime change at their expense in Libya in early 
2011, moved to protect Syria from a similar scenario (Joya 2012). 
 Finally, while the West proved unwilling to directly intervene militarily to end 
the war on Western terms (exit of Asad), the US and European states, either directly or 
via the Gulf monarchies, provided large numbers game-changing weaponry, notably 
anti-tank weapons, much of which was transferred to militant Islamist groups 
(Guardian 27 July 2016). They seized control of significant parts of Syrian territory and 
prevented the regime from recovering territorial control; the stalemate and failed state 
thus produced would otherwise have been quite unlikely. Thus, Western policies were 
decisive in creating two failed states in Iraq and Syria. These failed states (as earlier in 
Afghanistan) then became the sites of “blowback,” posing considerable threats to the 
West—in this case the dual threats of terrorism and mass migration.  
 
The Iraqi Government and the Syrian Uprising 
Iraq’s government initially attempted to balance between competing demands on it 
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over Syria, taking a minimalist non-partisan stand so as not to inflame the cleavages 
within its own population. The government of Nuri al-Maliki had only recently accused 
the Assad regime of involvement in terrorism in Iraq, but its fear that the rise of a 
Sunni-dominated government in Damascus would strengthen the already alienated 
Sunnis in Iraq’s western provinces soon became its overriding consideration. In Maliki’s 
words, ‘I’m not defending the regime. Change must take place. But if Bashar is toppled 
and salafis come to power, Iraq will face a sectarian war.’ Iraq abstained from the Arab 
League vote in 2011 to suspend Syria’s membership, rejected the US call for Assad to go, 
opposed further sanctions and the overthrow of the Syrian regime by force and argued 
that the crisis should be resolved by political reforms. While other Arab states 
downgraded ties with Assad, Iraq moved in the opposite direction. It hosted official 
visits, expanded business ties and provided material support. Particularly remarkable 
was Iraq’s willingness to evade US and EU demands to cut Iranian arms deliveries 
transiting Iraqi airspace to Damascus. To ward off these pressures and over-
dependency that the US could use as leverage over him, Maliki signed a $4.2bn arms 
deal with Russia. Having invested so much in Iraq, the US could not readily cut off aid 
without sacrificing its remaining positions in the country (Ruhayem 2012).  
 
Trans-state Spillover 
The Syrian and Iraqi conflicts rapidly became intertwined. This was symptomatic of the 
trans-state shared identities between the two states. Public opinion in the western 
Sunni-majority provinces of Iraq was supportive of the Syrian uprising. Fighters and 
supplies crossed from Anbar province, an arms supply route from Saudi Arabia. The 
Euphrates River Valley intimately connected Syrian and Iraqi tribes; during the US 
occupation of Iraq, the tribes and mosques of Deir al-Zur had provided support to 
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insurgents in Anbar province; now Iraq tribes sent money, weapons and fighters to 
support their Syrian cousins. With historic familial and financial links to ruling elites in 
Gulf states, they were conduits of the latter’s anti-Assad and anti-Iranian policy. Iraqi 
Sunnis from Mosul joined Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra and transferred their technology of car 
bombings and IUDs learned in the Iraqi insurgency (Knights 2012; Wieland 2012:206; 
Abeer 2012; Abbas 2012; Harris 2013).  
  In time, the Syrian conflict was increasingly internationalized as Sunni jihadists 
flocked to the two trans-state al-Qaida avatars, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. By 2015, 
around 27,000 foreign fighters from 86 countries were fighting the regimes in Iraq and 
Syria, with 16,000 from MENA, 5,000 from Europe, and 4,700 from former Soviet 
republics (Guardian 8 December 2015). In parallel, not only was Hizbollah increasing 
active on the regime side in Syria, but Iraqi Shia militias also travelled to Syria, initially 
to protect the Sayyida Zainab Shia mosque near Damascus against rebel attacks. 
However, they soon became involved in defence of the Syrian regime, with some 5-
10,000 fighting alongside Hizbollah and contributing materially to altering the power 
balance, particularly at the 2013 battle of Qusayr. They were mainly from the Badr 
organization, but also splinters from the Sadrists, such as the Iranian financed ‘Asa’ib 
Ahl al-Haq (AAH), (despite Muqtada al-Sadr’s refusal to endorse it); some had been 
involved in fighting against the US occupation and/or sectarian cleansing against 
Sunnis. Some were seconded from Iraqi army units, especially Shia special forces units, 
suggesting the complicity of al-Maliki’s government. New fighters were recruited in 
Iraq, via a discourse of martyrdom, to defend the Shia mosques and neighbourhoods 
from attacks by the taqfiris—Sunni jihadis who consider Shiites heretics liable to be 
killed. They were recruited via the internet, from pilgrims to the holy cities of Karbala 
and Najaf, trained by the Iranian Quds force and flown to Syria via Iran (Tamimi 2015; 
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Smyth 2015). Thus the top down instrumentalization of sectarianism by the rival 
regional powers intervening in Syria soon translated into social movements that saw 
themselves engaged in a sectarian conflict—a certain “bottom-up” sectarianization. 
 
 
State Re-making in Iraq and Syria? 
The merging Iraqi and Syrian conflicts had potential state re-making implications 
(Stanfield 2013). In Syria, with the collapse of order, many Syrians sought protection in 
sub-state or trans-state identities, such as Syrian Alawi vs. Sunni Islamist. In Iraq, the 
growing exclusion of Sunnis from the al-Maliki regime propelled them into the hands of 
radical Sunni Islamists. Owing to a combination of the displacement of persons by 
fighting and deliberate policies of ethnic or sectarian cleansing, many areas are 
becoming more homogeneous. Minorities, have fled or been killed in areas under IS 
rule, such as the Yezidis, leaving these regions more Sunni Muslim in composition. 
There has been ethnic cleansing of Arabs in areas under PYD Kurdish control along the 
Turkish border. The Asad regime has prioritized keeping control of minority-populated 
areas and minorities have fled to government controlled regions. Regime bombardment 
and sieges have sought to drive Sunnis out of strategic contested areas (Balanche 2015; 
Cockburn 2015). Similarly in Iraq, Shia are much more concentrated in government 
held areas while Kurds have been settled in Kirkuk at the expense of Arabs. In 
predominately Sunni areas outside central government control, an intense 
fragmentation along localistic and tribal lines has taken place in both states (Khaddour 
and Mazur 2013). This ethnic/sectarian “unmixing” is preparing the way for possible 
territorial re-design.  
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 At the same time, Syria and Iraq became, to an extent, a single arena of political 
contestation, with rival sectarian-constituted trans-group groups, both Sunni and Shia, 
moving back and forth between them as the balance of power dictated. Moreover, the 
debilitation of the states’ territorial control provided a unique opportunity for armed 
and proactive movements to advance alternative boundary busting projects. To be sure, 
only minorities in either state wanted a re-drawing of the boundaries of their states, 
most retained some identification with them, and even trans-state groups remained 
focused on the struggle over power in their own states of origin (e.g. Iraqi Shia militias 
backing Asad returned to fight in Iraq after ISIS seized Mosul). But two powerful forces, 
in particular, the Kurds and ISIS, posed a formidable challenge to the territorial status 
quo and in the name of two identities that had been violated by “Sykes-Pictot,” the 
“Kurdish nation” and “Islamic umma.” 
 The weakening of the two states greatly strengthened the Kurds’ national and 
separatist ambitions. Syrian Kurdish regions became effectively autonomous of 
Damascus under the PYD in parallel to the fully consolidated autonomy of the KRG in 
Iraq. Iraq’s Kurds took advantage of the defeat of the Iraqi army by ISIS to seize Kirkuk 
and raise the specter of independence, which, combined with possible demonstration 
effects among Kurds in Turkey and Iran, could be a first step toward carving a new 
Kurdistan out of the states system that a hundred years ago denied Kurdish national 
aspirations. As Barkey (2012) points out, Syria and Iraq are both at the ‘cusp’ of Arab-
Kurdish, Persian-Kurdish and Turkish-Kurdish divisions: ‘Before it has run its course 
[the Syrian uprising] could…even alter the region’s post-World War I territorial 
boundaries’.  
 In parallel, the ISIS movement, which seized control over wide areas of western 
Iraq and eastern Syria, declared the abolition of the Syrian-Iraq border a part of the 
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construction of a transnational “Caliphate.” ISIS exemplified the spiralling interaction of 
US intervention and state deformation in the Levant space. ISIS was an offshoot of al-
Qaida, which had roots in the US/Saudi aid to the mujahidin fighting the Soviets in 
Afghanistan; this US proxy was however so antagonized by the basing of US forces 
operating against Iraq in Saudi Arabia that it engineered the 9/11 attack on the US; the 
US response, the invasion of Iraq, created an anarchy in which al-Qaida flourished and 
where it provoked a sectarian war with Iraqi Shiites. When Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) was 
defeated in Iraq it found safe-haven in Syria and the collapse of Syrian state control over 
eastern parts of the country allowed it to seize Raqqa and other parts of the West of the 
country. ISIS now combined the remnants of AQI, disaffected Sunni tribesmen (many of 
whom had been trained and armed by the US against AQI) and ex-Iraqi Ba’thists 
(originally displaced by the US 2003 invasion) and its forces were heavily armed with 
US weaponry captured from the Iraqi army. In 2014, ISIS seized Mosul and proclaimed a 
caliphate straddling western Iraq and eastern Syria. It rapidly acquired some of the 
attributes of statehood including heavy weaponry, oil resources, control over cities, the 
ability to enlist wide Sunni disaffection, and, most remarkably, the defeat it inflicted on 
the Iraqi army at Mosul.  
 In Syria, after having been weakened by attacks from more Syria-centric 
elements of the Islamic opposition, including al-Qaida avatar, Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS 
turned the momentum acquired in Iraq to surge back across the border and put its 
rivals on the defensive. It benefited from a bandwagoning effect, as many disparate 
groups pledged fealty: ISIS had superior material resources, financial and military, 
provided by Gulf donors or seized from the failing Iraqi and Syrian states. It had a 
powerful religious message, a claim to protect Sunnis, and to provide a modicum of 
order and welfare where it governed. Many also submitted out of fear of ISIS’s 
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murderous reputation. Indicative of the high level of inter-state permeability was the 
penetration by ISIS fighters as far west as Lebanon. ISIS’s ambitions went beyond mere 
terrorism as it sought to seize, hold and expand territory and in these areas established 
the rudiments of state administration, providing employment, Islamic “justice” and 
undertaking surveillance and taxation.  
 The ISIS increased the dependence of the Syrian and Iraqi regimes on Iran, the 
power most immediately threatened by radical Sunni Islamism. The Iraqi and Syrian 
regimes have also benefited from the international interventions against ISIS (and other 
jihadists) by both the rival great powers, the US and Russia. Ultimately, however, the 
Iraqi and Syrian states can only recover from the jihadist challenge by much greater 
inclusion of the disaffected Sunnis, a task that in 2014 seemed beyond their capability. If 
the unmaking of the Versailles imposed-Westphalian system is still unlikely, it is no 
longer unthinkable. 3 
 
Conclusion: 
The fateful interaction of identity-fragmented states arbitrarily carved out of a 
preexisting Islamic space by Western imperial powers across the Levant had, almost a 
hundred years on, nearly uniform consequences: failed states and rampant 
sectarianism. Ultimately it goes back to Sykes-Picot—to what Fromkin (1989) 
perspicaciously called the “peace to end all peace.”  
 Different regime-building formula were used by would-be state-builders to get 
beyond this inauspicious starting point ranging from Lebanon’s consociational 
democracy, which accommodated and encouraged identity pluralism, to the Ba’thist 
authoritarianism of Iraq and Syria which sought to assimilate citizens into a common 
                                                        
3 For analyses of the roots and development of ISIS, see ISkhan (2015); Lister (2014) and Caris and 
Reynolds (2014). 
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Arab nationalism. In the latter cases, regimes became vulnerable to a reemergence of 
sub-state identities when the initial formula was dismantled—the cross-identity party 
organization weakened or destroyed and the Ba’thist ideology debilitated by economic 
troubles and/or military defeat. While there is no doubt that the often brutal and 
insufficiently inclusive power consolidation strategies of the neo-patrimonial leaders—
Saddam, Asad—was bound to provoke opposition, this, itself, was in part a function of 
the poor hand state-builders had been initially dealt in which legitimacy, the key 
substitute for coercion, was always precarious.  
 Once the ruling bargains, based on nationalist performance and material 
benefits, collapsed, leading to intractable conflict, the rival parties were enabled, in 
these easily penetrated societies to call on support from “kindred” trans-state actors. 
These divided societies were also highly vulnerable to the “competitive interference” of 
rival regional powers, making them sites of their proxy wars. Yet state failure has been 
in significant measure, a function of renewed intervention by global powers: in Iraq US 
invasion unleashed sectarian civil war across the region and in Syria the arming of both 
sides by the US, Russia, and European states together with regional Sunni powers and 
Iran drove an inexorable escalation of the violence. Russia’s intervention has driven a 
further escalation in violence in Syria. As such, global powers and indigenous MENA 
forces—whether collaborating with or resisting the former--“co-constituted” state 
deformation and state failure. 
 Flawed analyses and bad policies are intimately linked: analyses of what went 
wrong in Syria and Iraq that failed to put it in a historically long term context or to 
appreciate the co-constitution of the crises, were highly likely to exaggerate the role of 
agency—authoritarian leaders, Islamist extremists—and therefore to advocate 
superficial solutions such as military intervention against these “bad guys”, thereby 
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worsening local conflicts and turning them into world crises.  
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